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1. Introduction
This is an interesting and informative paper that explores pricing
behavior in a new market for macroeconomic derivatives. Asset mar-
kets where risk associated with future macroeconomic events can be
traded are a recent financial innovation. These markets may allow
more efficient sharing of macro risks and increase economic welfare. To
assess their potential, it is important to understand how well existing
economic derivatives markets function. Analyzing data from one such
market where claims on macroeconomic indicators including non-farm
payrolls are traded, this paper argues that (1) Expectations derived
from market prices are more accurate than survey-based forecasts and
less subject to behavioral biases; (2) The market predicts the probability
distribution of outcomes remarkably well; (3) Risk aversion plays at
most a small role in determining prices in this market.
I begin by discussing potential theoretical foundations for the empir-
ical findings. Then I briefly discuss features of the market mechanism,
and finally turn to the role of risk aversion. My comments suggest addi-
tional empirical tests that can sharpen our understanding of how mar-
kets for economic derivatives function.
2. Theory
Perhaps surprisingly, it is not easy to come up with plausible micro-
foundations for findings (1) and (2). Why are prices accurate predic-
tors of outcomes? And why are prices more accurate than survey-based
forecasts, when in many economic models, prices are functions of the
beliefs that forecasts measure? To answer these questions, I begin by
exploring the mechanism through which markets may aggregate infor-Comment 61
mation. A large theoretical literature (e.g., Grossman 1976 or more
recently Reny and Perry 2003) argues that markets correctly aggregate
heterogeneous information in the presence of common prior beliefs. In
practice, however, the common prior assumption appears to be at odds
with often-observed disagreement in survey forecasts among profes-
sional forecasters, because different individuals with common priors
cannot agree to disagree (Aumann 1976). A plausible alternative in this
context is to assume that disagreement is due to heterogeneous prior
beliefs.
However, with heterogeneous beliefs, as argued for example by Man-
ski (2004), it is not a-priori clear that predictive markets should correctly
aggregate information. To see the logic, note that in principle, a wealthy
individual with incorrect beliefs may be able to push prices away from
fundamental values by the sheer size of her investment. More formally,
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) show that with risk-averse investors and
a competitive market, the price will equal the wealth-weighted aver-
age belief in the population. This result confirms that market prices can
depart from true expectations if the distribution of beliefs is correlated
with wealth. On the other hand, in this model, accurate market prices
obtain if the average belief in the population correctly predicts out-
comes. This suggests that the reason why predictive markets function
so well is that the average belief of investors is correct.
To test this proposition, one can look for alternative empirical mea-
sures of beliefs. A natural candidate, used for example by Mankiw,
Reis, and Wolfers (2003), is survey-based forecasts. If one accepts that
such surveys are a good measure of beliefs, then the Wolfers-Zitzewitz
model predicts that surveys will forecast outcomes at least as well as
market prices. However, this prediction contradicts finding (1) of this
paper. How can prices be more accurate than surveys, when surveys
are a direct measure of investors' beliefs?
To resolve this contradiction, one has to relax one of the assumptions
of the previous argument. It must be that either (a) prices are not more
accurate than survey-based forecasts; or (b) surveys do not reflect true
beliefs; or (c) prices are accurate not because they reflect average beliefs,
but for some different reason. Distinguishing between these alterna-
tives would be useful to better understand the workings of predictive
markets.
Let us address each possibility in turn. Case (a) suggests that find-
ing (1) in the paper is due to other differences between the survey and
market data. Timing is one such difference: while the predictive market62 Szeidl
meets on the morning of the data release, the survey is collected up
to a week earlier. Given such differences in timing, information that
becomes available after the survey is collected may be reflected in the
market price. This explanation suggests that surveys are good measures
of expectations. From a practical perspective, this would be useful,
because survey data is more widely available than data from predic-
tive markets. Using the data of the current paper, this explanation can
be tested by comparing the differential accuracy between surveys and
forecasts depending on the difference in timing. When this explanation
is correct, surveys that take place later should be closer in accuracy to
market prices.
Case (b) may hold for example if survey respondents have little to
lose from making incorrect predictions, while market participants have
money at stake. In this case, earlier work where beliefs are measured
using survey based forecasts is potentially misleading. While there is
little doubt that predictions do improve when the stakes are higher, the
question is quantitative. How much does precision increase when the
stakes go up? A preliminary empirical approach to explore this ques-
tion is to compare the accuracy of predictions across markets with dif-
ferent stakes, as measured perhaps by total investment in short and
long positions. In markets with higher total investment, we should find
that prices are better predictors of outcomes.
In my view, case (c) is the least likely. If prices do not reflect average
beliefs, then we are back to the original puzzle: Why do prices in pre-
dictive markets forecast outcomes so accurately?
To summarize, the most plausible theory raises the question of
whether finding (1) is caused by the different nature of surveys versus
markets or their differential timing, and suggests additional empirical
tests to help sort out whether markets are just as accurate as surveys or
more accurate because the stakes are small for survey participants.
3. The Pari-Mutuel Mechanism
Understanding the logic of information aggregation in predictive mar-
kets is further complicated by the fact that the market mechanism is
not competitive. The market is a modified version of the pari-mutuel
mechanism often used in horse race betting. Eisenberg and Gale (1959)
explore Nash equilibrium in a simple version of the basic pari-mutuel
model. They establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium; how-Comment 63
ever, the equilibrium they find need not involve prices that correctly
predict outcomes. To quote the last sentence in their paper: "In the case
of two bettors with equal budgets if the first bettor's subjective prob-
ability distribution on two horses is ((l/2),(l/2)) then the equilibrium
probabilities will be ((l/2),(l/2)) regardless of the subjective probabili-
ties of the second bettor, as the reader will easily verify." Therefore, in
the special case discussed in the quote, the price will be independent
of the beliefs of the second bettor. This example suggests that exploring
the actual market mechanism in more detail can lead to useful insights
about the logic of information aggregation.
4. Risk Aversion
My final topic is the role of risk aversion. Using a simple model with
power utility investors, the paper shows that for reasonable coefficients
of relative risk aversion the risk premium of holding economic deriva-
tives should be very small. Based on this argument, the authors con-
clude that risk is unlikely to affect asset prices in predictive markets.
One problem with this logic is that the same calibration argument,
if applied to the aggregate stock market, would imply that risk plays
at most a minor role in determining expected stock returns, and that
the equity risk premium should be very small. As it is well known,
this implication of the model is robustly contradicted in the data (e.g.,
Mehra and Prescott 1985). This equity premium puzzle suggests that
the standard power utility model should not be used to assess the effect
of risk in influencing asset prices. An alternative approach to gauge
the impact of risk on prices is to note that for most investors, investing
in predictive markets is likely to be a relatively small risk. There are
studies suggesting that decision making in the presence of small risk
is well-described by loss-aversion preferences that have a kink at the
status quo level of wealth (see for example, Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman,
and Schwartz 1997). Calibrating a model with such loss-averse inves-
tors would be an empirically more plausible way to assess the role of
risk in affecting predictive market prices.
To conclude, this is an interesting paper that documents useful facts
about the functioning of economic derivatives' markets. I hope that my
discussion helps in suggesting additional empirical tests to sharpen our
understanding of the mechanism through which these markets aggre-
gate information.64 Szeidl
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